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Chongqing municipality, through its mayor Huang Qifan ( 黄奇帆 )and Party Secretary Bo Xilai ( 薄熙来 ), has launched a novel andambitious three-pronged policy: construction of social housing,
land reforms, and massive distribution of new hukou ( 户口 ) (8) to rural res-
idents. Apart from the magnitude of the reforms announced, the project’s
originality lies in the coherence of different policies and the state’s atten-
tion to ensuring stable and responsible financing. However, many ques-
tions are raised by the absence of political and judicial reforms to supervise
this economic and social development.
The first stage of reform is to build more than 40 million square metres
of social housing in ten years (2010-2020), three-fourths of that in the
first three years. This represents the total area of non-social housing sold
in Chongqing over three years. Eventually, some 30 to 40 percent of the
housing market is to consist of social housing ( gong zufang 公租房 ), with
60 to 70 percent left to housing at market prices; at present, social housing
in Chongqing accounts for a mere 5 percent of rental housing. Rents will
be on average 40 percent lower than the market price for equivalent areas.
To get this project going, the municipality set apart a buildable area of
more than 2,000 hectares. The housing is earmarked for single people
whose monthly income is less than 2,000 yuan or for couples with
monthly income under 3,000 yuan. In order to avoid social segregation
and to infuse dynamism in the localities, the government plans to build so-
cial housing in areas providing conventional accommodation. This would
also help boost the value of new constructions.
This highly ambitious policy of building social housing completes a
sweeping reform of land use rights that the Chongqing authorities began
in 2010. The central government imposed minimum quotas of cultivable
land in the total area controlled by local governments. With a view to de-
veloping Chongqing’s periphery while abiding by this constraint, the local
government introduced a credit system literally translated as “land trans-
action voucher” ( dipiao 地票 ), an authorisation for farmers developing
new land for agriculture to sell the right to use an equal area in the periph-
ery of cities for urban development. Thus, an entrepreneur wanting to use
ten hectares to build an industrial park outside Chongqing would have to
buy at market price a dipiao of ten hectares corresponding to the ten
hectares of cultivable land newly developed by one or more farmers in the
countryside. This is meant to ensure that urban development does not lead
to loss of agricultural land and that farmers also benefit from the fruits of
urban growth (80 percent of the value of dipiao goes to them and 20 per-
cent to village authorities).
In order to secure new agricultural land in the countryside, farmers have
to transform their residential areas ( zhai ji di 宅基地 ). Local government
policy is thus to expand the cultivable area (by transforming residential
areas into agricultural land) while reducing the number of farmers.
Economies of scale and productivity gains on these much larger areas
should boost agricultural production, even if the quality of cultivable land
obtained were mediocre, to say the least.
Finally, migration caused by the dipiao system implies a fundamental re-
think of China’s hukou or residence permit system. In an interview with Caixin
magazine, Chongqing mayor Huang stressed that the main beneficiaries of
the social housing policy are migrant workers and young graduates coming
to work in Chongqing. They are also the first to receive the 3.38 million new
hukous handed out in 2010-2011, the aim being to distribute ten million in
the 2010-2020 period. Residents of other regions are also eligible for this pro-
gramme. It is the largest hukou distribution ever in China and would raise the
share of urbanised Chongqing to 60 percent (from the current 29 percent).
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Local leaders hope this policy would yield major positive externalities: in-
creased agricultural production, development of Chongqing’s periphery, a
construction boom, lower property prices, public infrastructure, and so on.
From the government’s viewpoint, this would meet the “people’s basic
needs” ( min sheng 民生 ). It is thus developing collectivist rhetoric (more
than 50 percent of Chongqing’s expenditure would be earmarked for such
basic needs as housing, education, health, pensions, etc.). Meanwhile, apart
from the purely quantitative aspect of the investment realised,
Chongqing’s great originality rests in the local government’s involvement
and the financing model proposed.
In 2002, Chongqing created eight public investment enterprises ( ba da
tou 八大投 ) at the initiative of Huang, who was then deputy mayor, in
order to promote the public infrastructure policy. The development model
the Chongqing government sought to promote was that of the “Third
Hand” (alluding to Adam Smith’s “invisible hand”): the government would
take an active part in the market and generate profits that would then be
redistributed to the people. Construction of social housing is part of this
logic: a project realised from start to finish by the government and viable
in the long run despite low rents. The local government wishes to maintain
control over the allocation of social housing in order to ensure that houses
are not resold or sublet for profit. It is thus possible for tenants to become
owners in about five years, but they would not be able to resell their prop-
erty except to the local government. In contrast to what has obtained in
China thus far (sale of social housing with freedom to resell), the
Chongqing system is thus a closed one. The mayor often cites Hong Kong
or Singapore (where social housing is likewise entirely public), noting that
in some of China’s cities a mere 10 percent of land sold in recent years has
gone towards public housing; therefore state intervention is needed.
Chongqing authorities present this highly ambitious programme’s 
financing as responsible and integrated. More than 75 billion yuan is
needed for building the first 30 million square metres of social housing in
three years (out of the 40 million to be built by 2020). Out of this, 25 mil-
lion square metres will be financed by the local and central governments,
with the rest funded by financial institutions through loans. The major con-
tribution will come from banks (20 billion yuan at 6 percent interest) and
insurance firms (20 billion yuan at 4 percent interest); the latter are also
committed in terms of principal and interest. Social security funds, finan-
cial service providers, and bond issues will help cover the remaining 10 bil-
lion. Finally, the government hopes to cover the entirety of interest pay-
ments (about 2.5 billion yuan) through rents from the social housing. In
addition to the construction cost of social housing there is the cost of is-
suing 3.38 million hukou (2010-2011); the total cost is estimated at more
than 207.9 billion yuan. Of this, 130 billion yuan will go towards social se-
curity linked to the possession of urban hukou (mainly health and pen-
sions) and 77 billion yuan for the purchase of land from farmers (which will
then be resold via the dipiao market). The government remains optimistic
as regards social security expenditure: it has noted that the younger pop-
ulation, the first beneficiaries of hukou reform, would also be less demand-
ing in terms of social coverage. Again, social security spending is claimed
to be secure: the government is expected to participate to the extent of
30 billion yuan (the Chongqing government’s resources top 160 billion
yuan). More than 90 billion yuan will be assumed by enterprises, notably
through fiscal means (social charges on a worker with hukou being greater
than in case of a migrant worker), the rest coming from income obtained
as rent for social housing.
Nevertheless, in this period of debt crisis for local governments, ques-
tions arise as to the relevance of such an ambitious and costly policy for
social projects, which are by their very nature none too viable. The
Chongqing mayor has given assurances that his funding project is solid and
credible. It may be noted, however, that the low interest rates obtained
from public sector banks do not necessarily reflect the project’s hoped-for
viability. Moreover, 70 percent of financing comes from loans, which en-
tails very high leveraging and raises doubts as to the project’s eventual fi-
nancial maturity; besides, rapid returns on investment can hardly be ex-
pected. Only the income obtained from the dipiao policy, the ability to col-
lect rent, and economic development of new areas would ensure the pro-
ject’s financial viability. Meanwhile, unlike other in Chinese cities,
Chongqing’s government seems to enjoy a very high credibility capital
with banks. Further, although the clearly stated ambition of Huang Qifan
and Bo Xilai should work in favour of greater social justice, it is not the
same on the tax front. The Chongqing government certainly imposes a tax
on luxury housing, which helps collect more than 150 million yuan annu-
ally, but this remains symbolic (0.5 percent to 1 percent of apartment
value). Finally, the hoped-for economic fruits depend on the local econ-
omy’s ability to integrate all new arrivals. Otherwise, the city could well
face major economic and social problems: unemployment, maladjusted
public infrastructures, dropping salaries, etc.
Zhou Min and Xiang Pengcheng also point out that the absence of a ju-
dicial system to govern social housing makes it difficult to guarantee the
interests and rights of the poorest. Thus, although the project is particularly
ambitious on the economic front, it remains highly evasive and lacking in
judicial and political aspects (especially as regards the tax system and con-
ditions for resale of social housing). It would seem that the Chongqing
leadership’s enthusiasm is restricted to realising large-scale investment
without going in for much-needed institutional reforms. Thus the hukou
reform announced by the Chongqing government is not quite what it is
made out to be: it is all about giving the Chongqing hukou to a much larger
number of rural folk. But the system remains unchanged and the di-
chotomy between those possessing urban and rural hukous persists. Some
observers, including Hu Shuli, question the utility of retaining the hukou
system if such a larger number are to be bestowed with urban hukous. It
would be simpler to be rid of it. Mayor Huang responds that retaining the
rural hukou in fact helps farmers, especially when it comes to land pur-
chase and use. Actually, this argument further highlights judicial lacunae
with respect to land use rights in rural areas rather than the usefulness of
the hukou, which does not seem to be the most appropriate tool for de-
fending people’s rights.
The reform of land use rights raises several issues. It is quite probable that
youngsters and older people would be inclined to move to the city and ben-
efit from the urban hukou (the former to find work and the latter to obtain
healthcare); the issue is with regard to those aged 40 to 60. As Wang
Yuguang has stressed, after having accumulated assets in rural areas (hous-
ing, agricultural material, and land) and facing difficulty finding work in
cities at their age, it is quite probable that they would refuse to leave, all
the more so as compensation offered for land ceded in the countryside
might well be insufficient to afford an urban lifestyle. Further, the dipiao
system is rather complex for farmers to grasp, and it is possible that they
would have difficulty accepting or claiming their rights. Thus, in a somewhat
related but minor instance in Shenzhen, several farmers interpreted the
hukou change as land theft. Aware of this situation, the Chongqing govern-
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Since the start of the year, the difficulties of small and medium en-terprises (SMEs) have made national news. The situation grew seri-ous in April with the media speaking of an unprecedented “wave of
bankruptcies” ( daobi chao 倒闭潮 ); but Chinese authorities flatly rejected
such talk. Apart from the uncertain international economic context, three
main factors lie behind SMEs’ difficulties: a sharp rise in salary costs, rock-
eting raw material prices, and restrictive domestic monetary policy.
The phenomenon is especially noticeable in the Yangtze and Pearl River
deltas, where private small-scale export industries in particular have been
seriously affected. In Wenzhou City (Zhejiang Province), renowned for its
entrepreneurs, 40 percent of SMEs went bankrupt, and others suspended
production or shut their factories. Some SME bosses fled or committed
suicide as they were unable to repay loans, often procured in the informal
economy. (8) The contagion even spread to northern China, confirming the
national character of the crisis.
This wave of bankruptcies affecting SMEs in China is of a much different
nature from those closely linked to the 2008 financial crisis, which hit several
national economies (and hurt SMEs) around the world. In China, the difficul-
ties are mainly linked to the firms’ intrinsic weaknesses and to the complex
domestic context. The persisting global economic crisis is merely a second-
ary cause of the difficulties they face. Some entrepreneurs think the current
economic environment is much worse for Chinese SMEs than in 2008. Many
different industries were seriously affected, leading some entrepreneurs to-
wards speculation and property deals, where short-term profits are greater.
SMEs have been unable to retain staff due to sharply rising wage levels.
National People’s Congress Standing Committee member Gu Shengzu said
during a discussion on SMEs at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
summit in Chengdu in August 2011 that the average wage increased by 20
to 30 percent this year. This has led some SMEs to suspend orders, fearing
their inability to carry on operating, according to Caijing journalists Yang
Zhongxu and Mo Li. China’s labour market is gradually changing, and the
abundant labour model is now a thing of the past. The interprovincial
labour supply imbalance is becoming sharper, raising demand for a “new
generation” of skilled migrant workers.
The second cause of difficulties is the shortage and rise in prices of im-
ported raw materials, especially oil, on which the Chinese economy is
heavily dependent.
Apart from the three factors of production, other elements adding to the
SME crisis are appreciation of the yuan, various taxes, and the rising cost
of land. All these elements have led to a considerable rise in SMEs’ produc-
tion costs.
The current tight monetary policy leading to a sharp rise in the cost of
capital makes it difficult for SMEs to raise funds. The worst affected are the
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ment has introduced a transition period of three to five years during which
farmers would not only be able to live in the city but also retain the land
use rights acquired in their villages (including subsidies for crops) as well as
social rights (to have more than one child in some rural areas, for instance).
As Hu Shuli has noted, while this ambitious policy as a whole seems con-
cerned with securing farmers’ rights and appears humane, Chongqing’s rapid
urbanisation plans are nevertheless being carried out through administrative
diktat, which raises the question of possible drifts. Moreover, the model of-
fered in Chongqing relies on a special political organisation, and it would be
difficult to repeat it elsewhere: in fact, Chongqing is an autonomous munic-
ipality ( zhi xia shi 直辖市, like Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin ) and is thus not
dependent on any province. Chongqing’s government has a direct line to the
central authorities, which gives it considerable leeway in adopting innovative
policies and greater freedom in raising and disbursing funds.
Chongqing therefore appears to be a testing ground for a new type of so-
called “Third Hand” policy, at once interesting and novel. Given the city’s
constraints and particularities, however, it would be risky to see it as a
model for the rest of China.
z Translated by N. Jayaram
